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THE PROTESTER: A SENTENCING DILEMMA
JUDGE STEPHEN J. MCEWEN, JR.*
We have witnessed through recent decades an enhanced
awareness - and for some, perhaps, a deep chagrin - con-
cerning those individuals who employ public protest as a
method to present the dialectic and as a device to effect change.
Activists have, in recent decades, protested racial discrimina-
tion, the Vietnam war, nuclear power, and abortion. Their
efforts, as they decry a perceived bigotry, unjust war, a polluted
environment, and murder of the unborn, have presented fun-
damental constitutional issues.
Once the protest activity is halted by arrest and the protes-
ters must confront the criminal justice system, the protesters'
generally pursue two distinct and divergent paths through that
system. Most protesters, in the present time, seek to present
the defense ofjustification. The other course, more widely fol-
lowed in the recent past, is that pursued by the civil disobedi-
ence protester.
The largest portion of the citizenry not only blurs all activ-
ists and protesters as one group, but, in particular, overlooks a
basic characteristic which distinguishes those who practice civil
disobedience from other protesters and, in particular, from
those protesters who would assert the defense of justification.
A synopsis of the distinction seems purposeful.
The protester who asserts the defense of justification
presents a denial of responsibility for criminal activity based
upon the fact that he or she believed the conduct necessary for
the purpose of avoiding a greater evil or harm.2 The concept
ofjustification as a defense to the criminal charge arising from
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1. The focus of this article is the protester who engages in non-violent
protest activity. Thus the author precludes by definition such protest activity
as involves injury or destruction.
2. The defense of justification is also frequently described by the
process of its application, such as "choice of evils," "competing harms,"
"compulsion," "balancing of harms," "balancing of evils," and "balancing of
competing values." McEwen, The Defense of Justification and Its Use by the
Protestor, 91 DICK. L. REv. 1, 4 (1986).
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the protester's choice posits that every law has such stature as
to compel compliance, only where compliance will not produce
a greater evil than the failure to comply. The protester who
pleads justification does not seek excuse for harmful behavior,
but instead asserts that the "transgression is not only non-crimi-
nal but is, as well, proper. Thus, the defense, in essence, urges
that the criminal conduct was not forgivably wrong but was
right.
Civil disobedience, on the other hand, is a method of pro-
test which posits that while the obligation of conscience tran-
scends all duty to the state, the criminal activity performed
pursuant to that duty to conscience is not immune from pun-
ishment. Our country was recent witness to what many view as
the brightest chapter of civil disobedience, certainly in this
country, the historic revolution led by Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. Dr. King enthusiastically preached and fervently practiced
the principle that one who breaks an unjust law must do so openly,
lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty.' Dr. King urged
the notion that an individual who breaks a law that conscience
tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of
imprisonment in order to arouse the consciousness of the com-
munity to its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest
respect for the law.4
Although the citizenry and even some protesters have
failed to realize the considerable distinction between the pro-
tester who practices civil disobedience and the protester who
enters upon the defense ofjustification, the judiciary has exhib-
ited such a clear and certain grasp of the distinction that the
courts have established conditions precedent to the use of the
defense of justification by activists and protesters. 5
3. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, as the court on March 23, 1922, was
poised to sentence him for sedition, declared:
I want to avoid violence. Non-violence is the first article of my faith.
It is also the last article of my creed .... Non-violence implies
voluntary submission to the penalty for non-cooperation with evil. I
am here, therefore, to invite and submit cheerfully to the highest
penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is a deliberate
crime and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.
Gandhi: A Plea for the Severest Penalty upon Conviction for Sedition, reprinted in THE
LAW AS LITERATURE 461-65 (1982).
4. M.L. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 86 (1964). References to the
principles, programs, and conclusions of Dr. King are derived from this work.
5. The defense ofjustification is only available when: (1) the defendant
is faced with a clear and imminent danger, not one which is debatable or
speculative; (2) the defendant can reasonably expect that his action will be
effective as the direct cause of abating the danger; (3) there is no legal
alternative which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the
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It is, then, at the proceeding for the imposition of sentence
upon the protester the judge confronts a particular dilemma:
Should an individual convicted of criminal behavior (dis-
orderly conduct, trespass, or similar offenses) as a result
of protest activities, which do not cause or threaten per-
sonal injury or damage to property, be viewed more
favorably than an individual convicted of similar offenses
while not engaged in protest activities?
If so, should the perspective of the sentencing judge be
further affected by the fact that the offender has not
sought to avoid conviction by pursuing the defense of
justification, but instead acknowledges the offense and
submits to the punishment of the court?
The traditional purposes of punishment have been:
restraint, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. Revision-
ists have been generally successful in this century in urging the
view that the sentencing judge must provide concerned focus
upon the accused as an individual. The result has been a shift
in emphasis from retribution to rehabilitation.6 The fact that
the accused as an individual may in the recent age have been
legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate
choice regarding the values at issue. See Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 13
Mass. App. Ct. 373, 379, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1982). There remains
disagreement over which of these conditions the pro-life protester meets. See
Commonwealth v. Markum, 373 Pa. Super. 341, 541 A.2d 347 (1988)
(plurality opinion), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989).
6. A number of states have enacted sentencing codes which in major
measure echo the Model Penal Code for formulation of the statement of
purposes.
Section 1.02. Purposes; Principles of Construction
(2) The general purpose of the provisions governing the sen-
tencing and treatment of offenders are:
(a) to prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of
offenders;
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportion-
ate or arbitrary punishment;
(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that
may be imposed on conviction of an offense;
(e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just
individualization in their treatment;
(0 to define, coordinate and harmonize the powers, duties
and functions of the courts and of administrative officers
and agencies responsible for dealing with offenders;
(g) to advance the use of generally accepted scientific meth-
ods and knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of
offenders.
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the apparent7 beneficiary of enhanced attention from the
courts, or been the subject of model codes, is not, however, of
particular relevance to our discussion.
First, the character and motivation of the accused as per-
ceived by the Court has always been an essential factor during
the sentence deliberation and determination of the courts -
albeit, in earlier times, only to the disadvantage of the guilty.
Second, the protester is not within the class of criminal for
whom traditional concepts of punishment were devised or
modem codes drafted.
Thus, even with all of the edicts of concerned legislators
and all of the proposals of enlightened legal philosophers, two
questions persist:
Should the sentencing judge weigh as a factor
favorable to the offender that the commission of the
offense was an expression of protest?'
Section 7.01 Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprisonment and for
Placing Defendant on Probation
(1) The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted
of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment
unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is
necessary for protection of the public because:
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a
suspended sentence or probation the defendant will
commit another crime; or
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that
can be provided most effectively by his commitment to
an institution; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.02, 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
7. It remains for another time to discuss the assertion of some that,
however profound the effort, such codes are essentially cosmetic, since
retribution and deterrence have merely been disguised and remain dominant
purposes of punishment.
Though there may be rays of light in the landscape of the current
system of criminal justice, we have found few. If we ignore or
discount the latest treatment fad, it is because we have found that
new programs always turn out to be reincarnations of the same old
ideas. They are usually negligible in their human impact - a new
carrot with a sticks-and-carrots arsenal of managerial control. Often
they are a step backward, a covert method for increased surveillance
and control.
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 13
(1971) (prepared for the American Friends Service Committee).
8. This question posits a certain social significance to the protest.
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Should the sentencing judge weigh as a further fac-
tor favorable to the offender that the offender did not
employ the defense of justification, but pleaded guilty
and submitted himself to the court for imposition of
sentence?9
Both propositions trigger disagreement and intense
debate, even though the former position addresses a question
of essential difference and the latter an issue of but shades of
distinction.
Be that as it may, I submit in response:
That the offender who acts in an unlawful manner in the
expression of protest should be viewed in a more
favorable light in the sentencing context than the
offender who does not act in protest.
That one may not fault the sentencing judge who views
more favorably the protester who pleads guilty and sub-
mits to the punishment of the court, than he does the
protester who employs the defense of justification but is
found guilty.
Those to whom it is self-evident that the offender who
broke the law in protest may be perceived more favorably than
would otherwise be the case, view certain factors as situation-
ally dominant, including:
The character of the offender is a fundamental factor in
determining an appropriate sentence.
If the sincerity of the protester - to be distinguished
from any perceived worthiness of the cause which the
protester has embraced - is sound and intact, then the
evaluation of the character of the protester must be
favorable.
United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens
would, perhaps, view the situation differently. When a member
of the United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit, Jus-
tice Stevens declared:
One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into
his own hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that
9. It is to be left to philosophers in the present age and historians in the
future to debate which response to the charge of violation of the law is the
more efficacious method of accomplishing change; that is, those who plead
not guilty and seek to employ the defense of justification, or those who
practice civil disobedience by pleading guilty and accepting the punishment.
The accomplishments of Dr. King and his followers are, of course, eloquent
evidence of the efficacy of the latter method of protest.
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his own ability to determine policy is superior to demo-
cratic decision-making. Appellant's professed unselfish
motivation, rather than a justification, actually identifies a
form of arrogance which organized society cannot
tolerate. o
While this pronouncement might arguably have been
directed to the protester as a class, it may be reasonable to
assert that the intensity of the expression was triggered by the
particular circumstances of the offense (the offender had
engaged in the burglary of a Selective Service office and
removed and burned office records) and of the theory of the
defense (a religious compulsion negated the requisite criminal
intent). The protest activity which so repulsed Justice Stevens,
however, is beyond the ken of this article, since the protester
there had engaged in burglary and destruction of property,
prompting us to reiterate that civil disobedience, as here
defined, precludes the commission of offenses which involve
personal danger and destruction of property.
The issues under consideration is not whether to refrain
from punishment of the protester. Such individuals, however
well-intentioned, may never, under any circumstance, be
viewed as above the law. The initial proposition assumes, of
course, offenders of comparatively similar contact, or lack of it,
with the law, so that the comparison is between first offenders,
or frequent offenders, or repeated offenders. The second
proposition would distinguish between protesters by reason of
an essential distinction between the civil disobedient and the
protester who would plead justification, a distinction which
flows from the divergent manner of their response to the accu-
sation of offense.
The law is composed of two parts, namely, the mandate,
and the penalty. The civil disobedient acknowledges the maj-
esty of the law, for, while he does not comply with the mandate
provisions, he does submit to its sanction. The protester who
would plead justification, on the other hand, refuses to accept
the efficacy of either the mandate provision or the penalty pro-
vision. Thus, there is apparent validity to the suggestion that a
certain serenity is reflected by those who engage in civil disobe-
dience, while the protester who would assert justification" mir-
10. United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1971).
11. Since the offender is rarely permitted, by reason of the conditions
precedent, to enter upon the defense of justification, the subject of this
discussion is the protester who would, if permitted by the trial court,
undertake the presentation of the defense of justification.
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rors a certain defiance. Although such thoughts may be the
subject of sharp disagreement, there is considerably less ques-
tion about the observation that civil disobedience inspires,
however begrudgingly, a certain respect for a willingness to
accept the sanction of the law. The protester who would assert
justification, on the other hand, might to some seem mis-
guided, since the imposition of sanctions seems assured by rea-
son of a futile reliance upon an unavailable defense.
I submit that the offender who has violated the law in pro-
test may be viewed more favorably by the sentencing authority
than would otherwise be the case. Further, I believe that the
protester who, pursuant to the tenets of civil disobedience,
pleads guilty and submits to the sentence of the court may be
viewed more favorably than the offender who proceeds to trial
in futile reliance upon the defense of justification.
It is my hope, of course, that this article will inspire reac-
tion. From those readers for whom the conclusions are a
source of distress, I now beat a rapid retreat. For those readers
who concur with the conclusions, I pose a departing dilemma.
A number ofjurisdictions have enacted sentencing codes which
provide sentencing guidelines. Enactment of the federal guide-
lines is so recent that one only proceeds at peril to report con-
clusions, although the trend of the application of the guidelines
by the federal courts appears to be more rigid than relaxed.
Surely, in any event, the existence of such guidelines inhibits
the sentencing judge from imposing the sentence that would
otherwise be appropriate were the exercise of discretion allow-
able. The protester, however, is not within the class of criminal
to whom traditional or modem concepts of punishment are
directed. Thus, the newest dilemma: Do the guidelines pre-
clude, particularly in the case of the habitual protester, imple-
mentation of the foregoing recommendations? The legislature
certainly intended to restrict, if not extinguish, the discretion of
the sentencing judge. But can it validly be argued that the leg-
islature so purposed with regard to protesters? Thus our topic:
THE PROTESTER: A SENTENCING DILEMMA.
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